LNG Projects

Commonwealth LNG: A Detailed Look At Calcasieu’s Noisy Neighbors

March 2020

Total Pages: 22

Table Of Contents

  • Key Takeaways
  • Project Overview
  • Marine Facility Design and Layout
  • EPC Cost & Schedule Analysis
  • Additional Due Diligence Questions
  • Concluding Thoughts

Commonwealth LNG: A Detailed Look At Calcasieu’s Noisy Neighbors

Note 1: As expected (and highlighted in our Commonwealth LNG Report below), Venture Global has filed motion to intervene in Commonwealth’s project development due to its planned activity and dredging in the Calcasieu Ship Channel. We’ll continue to monitor.

Commonwealth LNG (CWLNG) is a proposed 8.4 MTPA LNG export facility located on a 393-acre site in Cameron Parish, Louisiana. The Project is on the west side of the Calcasieu Ship Channel (“the Channel”) near the entrance of where the Channel spills into the US Gulf of Mexico. The Project is also located directly across the river from Venture Global LNG’s (“VGLNG”) 10.0 MTPA Calcasieu Pass LNG (CPLNG) export facility (Figure 1).

In the 20-pages that follow, we’ve analyzed the CWLNG project and how the Project’s boundaries and shipping operations may be an issue for CPLNG, the State of Louisiana, and the U.S. Coast Guard. (Webber note: again - VG filed a motion to intervene after this piece originally went to clients in late February) 

CWLNG’s execution plan is based upon modularizing the LNG process and pre-treatment units as well as the LNG storage tanks. Typically, a full containment 160,000 m3 LNG storage tank takes 36 to 42 months to construct and commission. CWLNG has proposed modularizing six (6) 40,000 m3 single containment LNG tanks…(continued pages 2-22)

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