W|EPC: Venture Global’s Plaquemines Parish LNG – Q125 Project Review

Hydrogen Roadmap – Fuel Comparisons: Emissions, Feedstock, & CI Scores – Future Of Transportation (Part 3)

W|EPC: Analyzing Energy Project Contract Terms – Risks, Strategies & CompsKey Takeaways:1) Analyzing EPC Risk Avoidance: Comps & Techniques For Investors, Owners, & Contractors    W|EPC analyzed ~$20B of publicly available EPC lump sum turn-key (LSTK) contracts, focusing on sensitive or contentious terms used to allocate risk, manage performance expectations, & establish a framework for third-party indemnification and liquidated damages, etc. (Pages 3, 5-7, & 9-17).  Specific points of emphasis:Investors: Leveraging a project’s future expansion plans to protect ROE and/ maximize options (ROFR) options. (Pages 5, 9-11)Owners: Finding & justifying onerous contract terms as market or on-the-run. Contractors: Avoiding those onerous contract terms.2) Analyzing Notable Risks:    Liability & Indemnity: Existing Facilities can be problematic for Contractors & expose stakeholders. (Pages 5, 9-11)• Performance Guarantees & Damages: Numerous performance guarantees were publicly disclosed (likely inadvertently) that illustrates risks & production, emissions, and/or power consumption liabilities. (Pages 6, 12-14)• Technical Risk Allocation: One project’s subsurface provisions are tighter and limit change orders provisions for differences in soils data. (Pages 7, 15-17)

W|EPC: Southern Company (SO) – Vogtle Nuclear Expansion – Q420 Project Monitor – Key Questions That Could Haunt Cost Prudency
Key Takeaways: Vogtle Q420 Monitor – Key Decisions That Could Haunt Cost Prudency

• Who Will Be Getting Stuck With +$2.1B In Cost Overruns? Once Vogtle Unit 4 reaches “fuel load”, Georgia Power/Southern Company (GP/SO) can request a cost prudency determination to push their portion of cost overruns (~$2.1B) into recoverable utility rates. (Page 4)
Regulators will determine cost prudency based on project data, testimony, and a simple question: What should a reasonable manager have done at the time of the decision? (Page 5)
• We expect that process to be heavily scrutinized considering the scale of the overruns, and, in our opinion, some questionable GP/SO decisions. (Pages 4-5)

• Decisions That Could Haunt GP/SO’s Prudency. We believe there’s a case to be made that multiple GP/SO management decisions ran contrary to industry standards, potentially contributing to ($) billions in cost overruns, including
o A failure to either include or implement multiple EPC contract……(Page 7)
o For the first 4-years of the project, GP/SO used only…..(Page 23)
o In 2017, it appears GP/SO did not validate critical underlying EPC…..(Pages 9- 10)